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Slamming the Courthouse Door: 25 years of evidence for
repealing the Prison Litigation Reform Act
by Andrea Fenster & Margo Schlanger
April 26, 2021
Twenty-five years ago today, in 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. The “PLRA,” as it is often called, makes it much harder for incarcerated people
to file and win federal civil rights lawsuits. For two-and-a-half decades, the legislation has
created a double standard that limits incarcerated people’s access to the courts at all stages: it
requires courts to dismiss civil rights cases from incarcerated people for minor technical
reasons before even reaching the case merits, requires incarcerated people to pay filing fees
that low-income people on the outside are exempt from, makes it hard to find representation
by sharply capping attorney fees, creates high barriers to settlement, and weakens the ability
of courts to order changes to prison and jail policies.
When the PLRA was being debated, lawmakers who supported it claimed that too many
people behind bars were filing frivolous cases against the government. In fact, incarcerated
people are not particularly litigious. Instead, they often face harsh, discriminatory, and
unlawful conditions of confinement — and when mistreated, they have little recourse
outside the courts. And when incarcerated people do bring lawsuits, those claims are
extremely likely to be against the government since nearly all aspects of life in prison are
under state control. 1 While prison and jail officials may occasionally feel overwhelmed by
these lawsuits, cutting off access to justice ensures only that civil rights violations never
reach the public eye, not that such violations never occur.
The PLRA should be repealed. It was bad policy in the 1990s — an era full of unfair,
punitive, and racist criminal justice laws — and allowing it to continue today is even worse
policy.

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html
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As this graph demonstrates, the rate of civil rights filings in federal court immediately dropped following the
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. And ironically, despite Congress’s fears of prison lawsuits
flooding the courts, this data (which controls for the size of the prison population) shows that in 1996, when the
PLRA was passed, the frequency of lawsuits from incarcerated people was not on the rise at all; in fact, it had
already declined from its late 1970s peak. (For the underlying data, see Appendix Table A.)

The PLRA limits access to meaningful justice:
The PLRA hinders court access for incarcerated people who are trying to file civil cases —
which tend to be mostly civil rights cases. It does this by making these cases harder to bring,
harder to win, and harder to settle.
And when incarcerated people manage to overcome those high barriers and win a lawsuit,
the PLRA limits the ability of the courts to enforce policy changes through court orders.

The PLRA makes cases harder to bring:
Exhaustion rule: The PLRA makes many lawsuits non-starters by requiring cases to
be dismissed if plaintiffs have failed to “exhaust” all of the prison or jail’s internal
administrative grievance processes before taking their case to court. Working through
these administrative processes can be complicated, require meeting difficult deadlines,
and often prove fruitless. This allows suits to be dismissed for absurd and unfair
reasons; for example, when grievances were filed in the wrong color ink or failed to
meet incredibly tight deadlines as short as two or three days in some states. (See
sidebar for examples of how the exhaustion rule can cause civil rights cases to be
thrown out for minor mistakes in the grievance process.)
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html
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Justice denied:
Three cases thrown out due to the exhaustion rule
1. John Richardson sued a prison medical doctor whose egregious mistreatment
of his diabetes (the doctor took him off insulin despite the fact that his bloodsugar levels were out of control) led to gangrene and the amputation of his
leg. Richardson’s grievance had outlined how, as his symptoms worsened
after his insulin was taken away, his multiple requests for medical care went
unanswered. But when he brought a lawsuit against the doctor, that grievance
was deemed insufficient by the court because he had complained about the
lack of care following the doctor’s medical mistreatment, not the
mistreatment itself.
2. Gerald Brockington sued after being physically attacked by prison staff. The
court dismissed his case for non-exhaustion; his grievance was dismissed
because he had listed three issues together, instead of filing separate
grievances for each of his complaints (chemical weapons while restrained,
assault with a riot stick and chemical agent, and denial of medical attention).
3. Derrick Mack’s case was dismissed because his grievance was denied after
he submitted an internal grievance appeal using handwritten copies of prior
appeals (rather than the required photocopies), without informing prison
authorities that the photocopier was broken.

Three strikes rule: Indigent people on the outside can have federal filing fees waived
by bringing lawsuits in forma pauperis. But the PLRA makes incarcerated people,
who make $0.14 to $0.63 per hour on average, ineligible for this waiver, meaning they
must pay the $350 federal filing fee. While most incarcerated people may pay these
fees by installment over time, the PLRA’s Three Strikes Rule states that after filing
three claims that a judge decides are frivolous, malicious, or do not state a proper
claim, 2 incarcerated plaintiffs can be required to pay fees upfront with few
exceptions. This places lawsuits out of reach for nearly all the affected individuals.

And harder to win:
Physical injury requirement: Incarcerated people are allowed to sue over unlawfully
inflicted physical injury, but the PLRA restricts the remedies available in cases where
people are alleging only mental or emotional harm. Many courts have interpreted this
to mean that people cannot receive money damages for their prison/jail injuries unless
they can show that they suffered extremely serious physical injury. 3 Many courts
have also found that this provision applies even to Constitutional claims about, for
example, free speech, 4 religious freedom, 5 discrimination, 6 and due process, 7
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html
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thereby denying incarcerated people the ability to seek financial compensation for the
violation of their Constitutional rights.
Discouraging experienced attorneys from taking cases: To make it economically
feasible for lawyers to represent civil rights plaintiffs, Congress has entitled civil
rights plaintiffs who win their cases to recover reasonable hourly attorneys’ fees from
defendants. However, the PLRA imposes two sharp additional limits for incarcerated
plaintiffs: it caps recoverable attorneys’ fees at a below-market rate, and insists that
these fees total no more than 150% of any damages awarded to the plaintiff. But
damages for incarcerated people are generally quite low, both because they don’t
experience lost wages, and because (under the PLRA’s physical injury provision,
described above) they often cannot recover more than nominal damages absent
significant physical injury.
The result is that — knowing incarcerated plaintiffs cannot win reasonable attorney’s
fees — civil rights lawyers are deterred from taking them on as clients. Thus, an
overwhelming share of incarcerated people file their cases “pro se,” meaning on their
own behalf. In 2020, incarcerated civil rights plaintiffs had lawyers in only 7.6% of
their cases, compared to 89.8% of civil cases not involving incarceration. 8

And harder to settle:
Undermining settlements: In most types of litigation, parties have a lot of latitude to
craft settlement agreements that fit their needs. However, the PLRA sharply limits
court enforcement of settlements that include “prospective relief” — that is, a change
to policy or practice going forward; enforcement is allowed only if the court has
specifically found that these changes are necessary to cure the violation of a federal
right. Some courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that defendants cannot
merely agree that a settlement is appropriate; instead, these courts have held that either
the court must have enough facts to determine that there was a violation of a federal
right, or the parties must clearly stipulate that there was one. But one of the main
reasons defendants in all types of cases settle is to avoid those kinds of damaging
admissions. By making it so hard for incarcerated plaintiffs to settle, the PLRA takes
away their best chance at a positive outcome.
For individual incarcerated people, these various barriers add up to a system where it is next
to impossible to get any relief from the courts.

The PLRA also makes court orders less effective:
In other types of civil cases, judges can issue court orders, which can direct people or parties
to take or not take certain actions. Historically, court orders were a major source of
regulation and oversight for prisons and jails. However, the PLRA limits the ability of the
courts to make these types of adjustments to prison or jail policy by shortening the lifespan
of court orders and making it easier for them to be terminated. Under the PLRA, defendants
can ask the court to review and possibly terminate orders about prison conditions after just
two years, even if the prison or jail has not fully met all (or any) of the terms of the order. In
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html
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addition, the legislation makes it harder for a court to set a population cap (which might
require a jurisdiction to decarcerate) as a remedy for civil rights violations.

The PLRA made it harder for plaintiffs to win court oversight over prisons and jails, and easier for officials to
end existing orders. In the years after its passage, as preexisting orders were terminated, the portion of the
incarcerated population that was covered by court-ordered protection dropped sharply. By the end of 2006,
only seven states had system-wide court order coverage in their jails or prisons. (This graph only runs through
2005 for prisons and 2006 for jails because the necessary data was not collected by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics in its 2012 and 2013 surveys, and data collected by the BJS in 2019 has not yet been released.)

Recommendation:
It is time for Congress to repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Incarcerated people do
not lose all of their rights at the prison or jail door. Yet all too often, their basic freedoms are
violated inside these massive and expensive public institutions, which operate largely
outside of public view and with little oversight. Correctional facilities are obligated to fulfill
their duties to the people under their control, and it is in the public’s interest to ensure that
happens.
Yet the PLRA unjustly targets incarcerated people with disadvantageous procedural limits,
making it almost impossible for incarcerated people to have their day in court, earn
monetary damages for their suffering, and get and enforce prospective relief to prevent
violations in the future. Repealing the PLRA is a necessary step towards ensuring that
people behind bars have real and meaningful access to justice.

Methodology:
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html
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All data was collected by Professor Margo Schlanger. Prison and jail population data were
obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. In order to obtain the most comprehensive
and continuous data, prison population reflects single day counts, usually on December 31.
Jail population is average daily population.
Data on court filings, case characteristics, and case outcomes is from the Federal Judicial
Center’s Integrated Database. Schlanger excluded about 8,000 cases filed by one man, Dale
Maisano, because their inclusion would distort trend analysis. (These cases are routinely
dismissed without further processing under special “abusive litigation” court orders, so they
do not impose any burden on defendants.)
Court order coverage is based on data reported by jail and prison officials in the prison and
jail censuses conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics every five or six years. Since
1983, except in 2012 and 2013, the censuses have included questions about the existence of
court orders on a variety of topics. The resulting data are the most comprehensive
information available, despite the fact that there are important omissions. Details on
omissions are available here.

Appendix of Tables:
1. TABLE A: Incarcerated Population and Prison/Jail Civil Rights Filings, FY 1970 2020
This table depicts the underlying data for the first graph in this article. It shows the
decline in the number of suits filed by incarcerated people following the passage of
the PLRA.
2. TABLE B: Pro se litigation in U.S. District Courts, by Case Type and Fiscal Year of
Termination
This table shows the high percentage of cases brought by incarcerated people that are
filed pro se compared to other types of litigation.
3. TABLE C: Outcomes in prisoner civil rights cases in Federal District Court, by Fiscal
Year of Termination, FY 1988 - 2020
This table shows the outcomes of cases brought by incarcerated people over the past
32 years. As the table illustrates, the courts have become less and less hospitable to
claims brought by incarcerated people over time. Since the passage of the PLRA,
settlements, voluntary dismissals (which are often settlements as well), and trials have
all declined.
4. TABLE D: Outcomes in Federal District Court Cases by Case Type, Cases
Terminated FY 2020
This table compares outcomes of cases classified as prisoner civil rights/prison
conditions to other cases. As the table illustrates, the former are much more likely to
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html
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have a pretrial decisions for the defendants, and are much less likely to settle or end in
a voluntary dismissal. In the rare instances when these cases go to trial, incarcerated
plaintiffs are also less likely to win.
5. TABLE E: Prisoner Civil Rights Litigated Victories, FY 2012
Even when incarcerated people do manage to litigate all the way to victory, they tend
to be awarded only small damages.
6. TABLE F: Incidence of Court Orders, Local Jails and State Prisons, 1983 - 2006
This table contains the Bureau of Justice Statistics data underlying the second graph in
this article. The portion of the incarcerated population that was covered by courtordered protection dropped sharply a few years after the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
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nation’s fight to keep the prison system from exerting undue influence on the political
process (known as prison gerrymandering) and plays a leading role in protecting the families
of incarcerated people from the predatory prison and jail telephone industry and the video
visitation industry.

Footnotes
1. As the Supreme Court has explained, “What for a
private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with
his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with
his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the
State.” ↩
2. Stating a claim that is not a “strike” under these rules is
easier said than done, particularly for people who are
filing without legal assistance and who are unlikely to
have attained high levels of education. For example, Roy
Randall Harper sought damages for his emotional
suffering, alleging cruel and unusual punishment after he
was classified as an escape risk and moved to housing
where he was deprived of cleanliness, sleep, and peace
of mind. However, his damages claims were deemed
frivolous, not based on its facts or a decision that no
constitutional rights had been violated, but because he
was barred by the PLRA from recovering damages for
emotional suffering. Harper is one of many incarcerated
people whose claims may be tallied as “strikes” by the
strict definitions of the PLRA, despite outlining
significant, real-world suffering. ↩
3. For example, people incarcerated in Indiana who were
exposed to asbestos were denied damages absent
demonstrated physical harm. ↩
4. For example, prison officials allegedly retaliated against
Nathaniel Brazill for complaining to a state senator
about censorship of a book that recounted the abuse of

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html

people in jail. He subsequently lost his job as a Certified
Law Clerk. However, despite the fact that the court
found his free speech claim to be plausible, he was
unable to get compensation because he could not show a
physical injury. ↩
5. In one case, Daniel Mayfield alleged that he was not
allowed to practice his religious ceremonies or have
access to religious runestones. He was not able to seek
compensation, though the court found that his rights may
have been violated by the prison. ↩
6. In West Virginia, Benjamin Patino Lopez was allegedly
excluded from rehabilitative programming because he is
Hispanic, and was subsequently prescribed antidepressants. However, he could not show a physical
injury, and therefore could not receive any compensation
for the violation of his rights. ↩
7. For example, Aaron Isby-Israel was unable to show
physical injury after spending more than 11 years in
solitary confinement; while the court found the harm he
suffered to be “obvious,” he was unable to recover
money damages because the harm was not physical in
nature. ↩
8. This statistic was collected by Margo Schlanger from the
Federal Judicial Center’s integrated database, as
described in paragraph 2 of the methodology. ↩
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